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The IEA has estimated that over the next four decades US$31 trillion will be required to promote energy
efﬁciency in buildings. However, the opportunities to make such investments are often constrained,
particularly in contexts of austerity. We consider the potential of revolving funds as an innovative ﬁ-
nancing mechanism that could reduce investment requirements and enhance investment impacts by
recovering and reinvesting some of the savings generated by early investments. Such funds have been
created in various contexts, but there has never been a formal academic evaluation of their potential to
contribute to low carbon transitions. To address this, we propose a generic revolving fund model and
apply it using data on the costs and beneﬁts of domestic sector retroﬁt in the UK. We ﬁnd that a revolving
fund could reduce the costs of domestic sector retroﬁt in the UK by 26%, or d9 billion, whilst also making
such a scheme cost-neutral, albeit with signiﬁcant up-front investments that would only pay for
themselves over an extended period of time. We conclude that revolving funds could enable countries
with limited resources to invest more heavily and more effectively in low carbon development, even in
contexts of austerity.
& 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
1.1. The importance of the climate ﬁnance gap
Tackling climate change undoubtedly represents an enormous
challenge, but at the global scale the economic case for tackling it
is compelling. Stern famously estimated that the costs of avoidingr Ltd. This is an open access article
dson),
J. Millward-Hopkins),
i@york.ac.uk (C. Topi),climate change could be between 1% and 2% of global GDP, but the
costs of suffering climate change could amount to between 5% and
20% of GDP per year (Stern, 2007). Even with such a compelling
global case for action, however, it is clear that an effective re-
sponse still requires enormous levels of investment. It is also clear
that the general, long term, social case for action on climate
change does not always translate into a speciﬁc, short term, pri-
vate case for investment, and that the availability of public funds is
frequently constrained in contexts of austerity. Particularly in
some settings, these factors have led to levels of ﬁnancing for low
carbon development that are much lower than many estimates of
what is necessary. The IPCC (2014) estimated that global invest-
ment in climate mitigation and adaptation was in the range of USDunder the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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and Buchner et al. (2013) suggested that global climate ﬁnance
ﬂows have plateaued at USD 359 billion. Both of these estimates
equate to roughly 0.5% of global GDP; approximately one third of
the upper end of the investment needs as estimated by McKinsey
(2010), GEA (2012), WEF (2013), McCollum et al. (2013) and IEA
(2013a) and one quarter of the upper end of the investment needs
as set out in the Stern Review (Stern, 2007).
The need for an effective response to under-investment in cli-
mate mitigation is pressing. As the years pass, decisions are made
that will lock the world in to high carbon development paths for
years to come, whilst at the same time long lived emissions con-
tinue to accumulate in the atmosphere and the opportunity to
make investments that will help to avoid dangerous climate
change diminishes. Indeed, the IEA (2013a, p3) reported that ‘the
goal of limiting warming to 2 °C is becoming more difﬁcult and
more costly with each year that passes’. In assessing the scope to
avoid dangerous levels of climate change by limiting atmospheric
emissions to no more than 450 ppm, a level that is associated with
a good chance of avoiding dangerous climate change (IPCC, 2014),
the IEA (2013a, p3) ﬁnds that ‘almost four-ﬁfths of the CO2
emissions allowable by 2035 are already locked-in by existing
power plants, factories, buildings, etc. If action to reduce CO2
emissions is not taken before 2017, all the allowable CO2 emissions
would be locked-in by energy infrastructure existing at that time’.
But the conditions for investment in low carbon development
have hardly been ideal in the last few years. The failure to reach a
global agreement on climate change in Copenhagen in 2009 co-
incided with the ﬁnancial crisis and the start – in many countries –
of a period of instability, uncertainty, recession and austerity. In
many settings, for the past few years at least, more emphasis has
been placed on these economic and ﬁnancial issues than on
tackling climate change. Indeed, as market instability and policy
uncertainty limit private investment, and budget deﬁcits and
austerity limit public investment, it seems appropriate to explore
some innovative ways of substantially increasing investment in
low carbon development.
1.2. The potential role of revolving funds
With this in mind, this paper explores the case for the creation
of an innovative ﬁnancing mechanism – the revolving fund –
where the savings from investments in energy efﬁciency and other
forms of low carbon development are captured and reinvested to
either reduce the need for new ﬁnance or to increase the impact of
what ﬁnance there is. Such funds have been discussed before (EC,
2011; Forum for the Future, 2011; DECC, 2012a; IEA, 2013b) and
have been adopted in different contexts to fulﬁl a range of objec-
tives including energy efﬁciency upgrades, promotion of renew-
ables, the provision of clean water and the clean up of con-
taminated land. Examples of such revolving funds include:
 The US Clean Water State Revolving Fund that was established
in the 1990s and has provided over 33,000 loans with a total
value of over $100 billion (USEPA, 2015).
 The Thai Energy Efﬁciency Revolving Fund that since its creation
in 2003 has invested c$470m in 294 energy efﬁciency projects,
mostly in factories (Grüning et al., 2012).
 The UK SALIX revolving fund that since its establishment in
2004 has invested d339 million in over 12,000 energy efﬁciency
and renewable energy projects in the public sector with esti-
mated fuel cost savings of d1.2 billion (SALIX, 2015).
 The US Sustainable Endowments Initiative that was set up in 2005
and has since helped to create 79 revolving funds that invested
over $100 million of investment in energy efﬁciency and renew-
able energy projects in higher education institutes (SEI, 2015).Various other revolving funds have also been created for urban
regeneration, infrastructure provision and economic development.
However, although there were evaluations of revolving funds for
water and infrastructure provision in the 1990s (see Holcombe,
1992; O’Toole, 1996), as far as we are aware there has never been a
formal academic evaluation of the contribution that such funds
can make either to reducing the cost of achieving particular carbon
reduction targets or to enhancing the impacts of scarce low carbon
investment funds. This lack of academic analysis on the potential
of revolving funds to help mitigate climate change is not unusual –
indeed the IPCC (2014) notes that the scientiﬁc literature on in-
vestment and ﬁnance to address climate change is still very lim-
ited and that knowledge gaps are substantial.
1.3. The need for investment in energy efﬁciency in buildings
These factors are particularly signiﬁcant for the buildings sec-
tor. Globally, over one-third of all ﬁnal energy and half of elec-
tricity are consumed in buildings that are therefore responsible for
approximately one-third of global carbon emissions (IEA, 2013b).
Energy use in buildings is therefore of critical importance, and
many reports highlight the presence of cost-effective opportu-
nities to improve their energy efﬁciency (IPCC, 2014). However, the
IPCC (2014) noted that many potentially attractive energy efﬁ-
ciency investments do not meet the short-term ﬁnancial return
criteria of businesses, investors, and individuals. As a result, the
IEA (2013b) predicted that without a concerted push from policy,
two-thirds of the economically viable potential to improve energy
efﬁciency in buildings will remain unexploited by 2035.
The reasons for this inertia relate to the presence of strong
barriers to change. The IPCC (2014) cited imperfect information,
split incentives, lack of awareness, transaction costs, inadequate
access to ﬁnance, industry fragmentation, the need for new de-
livery mechanisms and the absence of pipelines of bankable en-
ergy efﬁciency projects as signiﬁcant barriers. Focusing speciﬁcally
on the ﬁnancial barriers, the IEA (2013a) highlighted the im-
portance of up-front costs, levels of risk, issues with interest and
discount rates and the inadequacy of traditional ﬁnancing me-
chanisms for energy-efﬁcient projects. New forms of policy sup-
port, new institutional arrangements, new forms of ﬁnance, and
new business models are therefore required if the energy efﬁ-
ciency opportunities in buildings are to be exploited (DECC, 2012a;
GEA, 2012; IEA, 2013a; IPCC, 2014).
The scale of the challenge is formidable – the IEA (2013b) es-
timated that over the next four decades USD 31 trillion will be
required to promote energy efﬁciency in buildings at a rate that
gives the world a good chance of limiting the temperature in-
creases associated with climate change to 2 °C. Whilst the IEA
(2013a) suggests that ‘it is widely recognised that mobilising huge
investment into energy efﬁciency is essential’ it also argues that
‘offering advantageous ﬁnancing mechanisms is likely to require
public funds and these may be harder to justify with tighter public
budgets’ and that as a result mobilising private as well as public
sector ﬁnancing will be essential. In 2008, the IEA argued that one
way of doing this might be to establish revolving funds for
building refurbishment and retroﬁt (IEA, 2008).
1.4. The European context
These issues are particularly relevant in Europe. The European
Commission has set a target of reducing energy consumption by
20% by 2020, with performance assessed relative to business as
usual projections that include assessments of background trends
in energy use and energy efﬁciency (EU, 2012). It has also re-
cognised that €100 billion a year will be needed to reach this
target, and it has set aside €27 billion to support the transition to a
Fig. 1. The basic structure of the revolving fund.
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novation Funds and €265 million for a European Energy Efﬁciency
Fund. It has also recently established the Energy Efﬁciency Fi-
nancial Institutions Group to ﬁnd new ways of overcoming bar-
riers and scaling up investment in support the search for new
ways of supporting energy efﬁciency investments, particularly in
buildings renovation (EEFIG, 2015). In each of these areas, there is
a pressing need not only to make more funds available for energy
efﬁciency and low carbon transitions, but also to signiﬁcantly en-
hance understanding of the ways in which those funds could be
most effectively and efﬁciently deployed.
The European buildings sector is a central part of the wider
drive to improve energy efﬁciency. Energy use in buildings ac-
counted for 34% of total ﬁnal energy demand in Europe in 2007,
with the residential sector accounting for 23% and the commercial
sector 11% (GEA, 2012). The European Commission (2011, p8)
stated that ‘In Europe, the built environment provides low-cost
and short-term opportunities to reduce emissions, ﬁrst and fore-
most through improvement of the energy performance of build-
ings … emissions in this area could be reduced by around 90% by
2050’. It also stated that the buildings sector provides the second
largest untapped and cost-effective potential for energy savings
after the energy sector itself (EC, 2011). Like many others, the EC
recognised the importance of ﬁnance and investment if the tran-
sition to more energy efﬁcient buildings is to be made. There is
recognition that there needs to be a marked improvement in ﬁ-
nancial incentive structures and that ‘Innovative programmes will
be needed to eliminate information barriers, reduce transaction
costs and mobilise investment capital’ and that smart ﬁnancing
schemes are needed that can leverage private sector investments
(ECF, 2010 p16). Indeed, the European Union has stated that ‘Public
ﬁnance through innovative ﬁnancing instruments, such as revol-
ving funds, preferential interest rates, guarantee schemes, risk-
sharing facilities and blending mechanisms can mobilise and steer
the required private ﬁnance’ (EC, 2013, p11).
1.5. The focus and structure of this paper
Within the broader context of the issues and knowledge gaps
relating to climate ﬁnance in general and revolving funds in par-
ticular that have been introduced above, this paper explores the
case for the creation of revolving funds that could be used to in-
crease levels and enhance the performance of investments in en-
ergy efﬁcient and low carbon buildings. Based on the development
of a model designed to explore and illuminate the workings of a
revolving fund, the paper considers the impacts that such a fund
could have on the ﬁnancing of a large-scale energy efﬁciency
programme for the domestic sector in the UK. Data are drawn
from various formal assessments of the costs, performance and
scope for deployment of different energy efﬁciency and low carbon
measures that could be adopted across the UK housing stock. In
order to test the sensitivity of the model to changes in real world
conditions, provision is made to adjust variables including
household repayment levels, energy prices, administrative costs,
incentives for participation, performance gaps and rebound ef-
fects. Results are presented for a number of different scenarios,
each with a slightly different design. The ﬁndings of the analysis
for each speciﬁc case are presented and key issues in the gov-
ernance of revolving funds are discussed before the wider im-
plications for policy and practise are discussed.2. Methods-creating a basic revolving fund model
Revolving funds could come in many different forms, with
different structures, scales, business models and governancearrangements. In this paper, we explore the case for a large-scale
revolving fund that could be adopted – by actors in the public,
private or civic sectors on either a for-proﬁt or not-for-proﬁt basis-
to fund energy efﬁciency or low carbon investments in domestic
buildings.
2.1. Model design
The basic structure of the revolving fund assessed in this paper
is set out in Fig. 1. This ﬁgure shows the ﬂows of ﬁnance into,
around, and out of the revolving fund, and creates the basis for our
analysis of different variables within the fund. At the heart of the
revolving fund as conceived here is a new entity (here called a
Special Purpose Vehicle or SPV) that is established to receive new
investment funds from different sources and to invest these in
energy efﬁciency and low carbon measures in households.
Our baseline model calculates the total investment needs as-
sociated with the widespread adoption of a range of energy efﬁ-
ciency and low carbon measures in a particular country, region, or
city. For simplicity, we assume that the up-take of such measures
is entirely ﬁnanced through the revolving fund and that impacts
are additional to wider background trends. To enable us to adjust
the investment needs to reﬂect the available investment resources,
the model sets a maximum proportion of this total that can be
ﬁnanced through the fund each year. Funds – that can be provided
by the government, banks, institutional investors or local com-
munities – are borrowed by the SPV at a real (i.e. after inﬂation)
interest rate. The model then assumes that a proportion of the
total capital loaned to the SPV will be repaid to the original fun-
ders each year. The SPV, after making these repayments and cov-
ering its administrative costs, then invests any remaining funds in
energy efﬁciency and low carbon measures.
The SPV then makes money available to fund a wide range of
Table 1
List of energy efﬁciency and low carbon measures assessed.
Measure Lifetime
(years)
Payback period for mea-
sures installed in 2014
(years)
Loft insulation from 0 to 270 mm 40 2.4
Loft insulation from 25 to 270 mm 40 4.2
Loft insulation from 50 to 270 mm 40 6.4
Loft insulation from 75 to 270 mm 40 8.0
Loft insulation from 100 to 270 mm 40 22.3
Cavity wall insulation for homes
built before 1976
40 3.6
Cavity wall insulation for homes
built between 1976 and 1983
40 7.4
Cavity wall insulation for homes
built after 1983
40 15.8
DIY ﬂoor insulation for suspended
timber ﬂoors
40 4.1
Solid wall insulation 40 33.6
Paper type solid wall insulation 40 176.1
Best practise standard windows 25 28.7
Uninsulated hot water cylinder to
high performance cylinder
20 4.7
Modestly insulated hot water cy-
linder to high performance
cylinder
20 51.0
Primary pipework insulation 15 4.1
Improve airtightness 25 6.3
Thermostatic radiator valves 15 15.1
Room thermostats 15 6.1
Hot water cylinder thermostat 15 176.1
Efﬁcient lighting 10 3.2
Photovoltaic generation with FIT 20 20.4
Micro wind turbines (1 kW) with
FIT
10 16.9
Mini wind turbines (5 kw) with FIT 15 9.1
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is assumed that the SPV offers a menu of measures that house-
holds could opt to apply, but that the SPV ultimately decides
which measures it will invest in. In taking this decision, the SPV
has some limited scope for optimising its investments, and the
model allows for measures to be prioritised according to their Net
Present Value (NPV), pay-back period, or carbon savings per pound
invested. To reﬂect constraints that may arise due to a limited
availability of local installers, for example, the maximum annual
deployment potentials of any measure can also be set. Once the
maximum available potential of the top priority measure is
exploited in any one year, any available funds remaining are di-
verted to the next highest priority. Allowance is also made for the
costs and the proﬁts of the installers.
Households are encouraged to participate by being offered a
share of the savings generated by measures whilst investment
costs are being recovered, and all of the savings thereafter for the
remainder of the life of the measure. Other inducements to en-
courage participation, such as cash-back vouchers and govern-
ment subsidies are also allowed for by the model. We do of course
recognise that ﬁnancial incentives alone may not stimulate sig-
niﬁcant levels of participation and that any scheme will need to be
designed and run in ways that raise awareness, minimise risk and
disruption and build trust and conﬁdence in the scheme (Dowson
et al., 2012; Rosenow and Eyre, 2013). These non-ﬁnancial aspects
are critically important and will determine levels of take-up by
households and thus the scale of the investments that can be
made and the carbon savings that can be stimulated by the re-
volving fund.
Where participation can be promoted, households make reg-
ular periodic repayments to the SPV that allow it to recoup its ﬁ-
nancial investment. Repayments are based on a set percentage of
the expected cost savings that arise from implementing the carbon
efﬁciency measures after taking into account the impacts of per-
formance gaps and direct rebound effects. Performance gaps re-
ﬂect the difference between the technical savings that could be
generated by a measure and the real savings that are likely to
occur in practice with imperfect installation or operation. Direct
rebound effects reﬂect the fact that householders may consume
some of the efﬁciency beneﬁts through increased comfort levels so
that the measures achieve lower savings than predicted.
After taking these factors into account, an agreed proportion of
the savings realised from each of the different measures funded is
recovered and fed back to the SPV by the companies that supply
energy to the building. The energy companies are paid a small fee
for acting in this way. The period over which the payments are
made is then determined in a way that ensures that the Internal
Rate of Return (IRR) to the SPV from the original investment
reaches a pre-determined threshold. This will ensure the ﬁnancial
resilience of the SPV. A consequence of this funding mechanism is
that, the more effective the measure, the shorter the time period
over which repayments are made (see Table 1). In some cases, the
repayment period for a measure is longer than its effective life-
time. In this case, the household makes repayments until the
measure is no longer effective, with the SPV then absorbing any
ﬁnancial shortfall. Although the SPV does not achieve the
threshold IRR on these economically unviable projects, these
measures are still funded because of the carbon savings that they
generate.
As some householders may renege upon their ﬁnancial ob-
ligations, the total ﬂow of savings fed back to the SPV also has to
be reduced to take defaults into account. After adjusting to account
for these defaults, any recovered funds are used to repay the SPVs
original funders/investors with interest, and after this any re-
maining funds are recycled and reinvested in further energy efﬁ-
ciency measures in households. Once all available potential for thedeployment of energy efﬁciency and low carbon measures has
been exploited, and all debts to original funders have been repaid,
the SPV can generate a revenue stream for its owners (who could
be central or local government, local communities or private en-
tities). This revenue stream could be taken as income or reinvested
in other low carbon initiatives.
2.2. Application and data sources
To apply the model of the revolving fund described above, and
to make use of available datasets, we focus on the scope for energy
efﬁciency and low carbon measures to be installed in the domestic
sector in the UK. The UK has 26 million residential buildings, most
of which were constructed before 1980 and have relatively low
levels of energy efﬁciency (Sweatman and Managan, 2010; Web-
ber et al., 2015). Domestic energy use and carbon emissions have
fallen in recent years as a result of a range of market and non-
market factors, but domestic energy use still accounts for around
25% of UK carbon emissions (DECC, 2013b). The retroﬁtting of
much of the existing housing stock is still required therefore, but
current rates of retroﬁt are unlikely to meet current targets and a
substantial increase in the rate of their adoption is required (CCC,
2014).
To assess the contribution that a revolving fund could make to
the ﬁnancing of an extensive retroﬁt programme in the UK, we
draw input data on the costs, performance and scope for deploy-
ment of a range of these measures from a model that was devel-
oped by the UK Building Research Establishment for the UK
Committee on Climate Change (BRE, 2008). This is the most
comprehensive publicly available data set that is currently avail-
able; in the analysis below some key aspects of it (particularly
energy prices, carbon intensities of electricity and levels of subsidy
and feed-in-tariffs) are updated to reﬂect current conditions and
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ﬁndings to key assumptions within the data, including perfor-
mance gaps and rebound effects.
We use input data on 23 energy efﬁciency and low carbon
measures including different levels of loft, cavity, solid wall and
ﬂoor insulation, improved lighting and appliances and micro-
generation from solar photo-voltaics and small wind turbines. A
full list of the measures – including their estimated lifespans and
payback periods – is included in Table 1. Input data on the costs of
the different measures takes into account the purchase, installa-
tion, running and maintenance costs and the different lifespans of
each measure.
To assess the performance of each measure, the input data
considers their impact in a standard or ‘average’ UK house that has
already been upgraded to a good standard of energy efﬁciency. As
many UK houses are not yet at this level of efﬁciency, and as en-
ergy prices could be higher than predicted, each measure could
have a greater impact than is incorporated in our calibrations.
Savings are then calculated using up-to-date energy prices for
multiple scenarios integrating low, central and high projections of
future energy prices (DECC, 2012b). We assume that both tech-
nology prices and current levels of feed-in-tariff stay constant
throughout the analysis. Carbon savings are calculated using the
most recent assessments and forecasts of the carbon intensities for
electricity generation (DECC, 2012b). The scope for deploying each
of the measures in suitable houses across the entire UK housing
stock is also assessed in the model, based on data from the UK
Committee on Climate Change. This data takes into account the
proportion of homes that may be hard to reach, it adjusts for
background trends in the take-up of different measures and it has
been up-dated to 2012 levels. By considering the total scope for
deployment of each measure across the UK, assessments of each
individual measure can be scaled up to consider aggregated costs
and beneﬁts if all measures are installed in every suitable property
in the UK.
2.3. Default settings and variations
To run the model using the input data described above, we use
a series of default settings for each of the key variables. These are
presented in Table 2. These settings are based on a series of as-
sumptions that have been informed by, for example, the UK Green
Deal impact assessment (DECC, 2012c) and the adoption of do-
mestic energy efﬁciency schemes in cities such as the Birmingham
Energy Savers scheme (BES, undated) and the Leeds City Region
Domestic Energy Efﬁciency Programme (LCR, undated). We
therefore believe that these settings realistically reﬂect theTable 2
Default settings.
Variable Default setting
SPV maximum borrowing level from external sources (as % of
total investment need)
5%
SPV borrowing rate (real) 3%
SPV annual repayment of loan (as % of total loan) 5%
SPV running costs (as % of overall investment) 3%
SPV required internal rate of return (real) 4%
Measures considered All
Maximum exploitation of any measure in any year 20%
Installer costs 10%
Household repayment to SPV as proportion of total savings
during repayment period
75%
Performance gaps 41.6%
Direct rebound effects 15%
Household default levels 5%
Cost recovery administration cost 0.1%conditions under which a large-scale revolving fund might operate
in the UK, whether at the national or the city scales.
The default settings assume that the SPV at the heart of the
revolving fund can, in any one year, borrow a maximum of 5% of
the total investment required to exploit the full potential of all
measures. This is at a real interest rate of 3%. We also assume that
the SPV would repay 5% of its existing total borrowing in any year,
until the point where all investments had been made when any
surplus funds generated through on-going savings would be used
to clear any remaining debts. We also assume that the SPVs run-
ning costs would equate to 3% of its annual level of investment and
that its threshold IRR is 4% real. We assume that the SPV may, over
time, invest the full amount required for the full deployment of all
23 measures included in the assessment. Because of limited
availability of installers and limited levels of take-up, we assume
that in any year a maximum of 20% of the potential take-up of any
one measure can be exploited. We also assume that installers
charge 10% of the capital cost of any measure. It is assumed that, as
an incentive to participate, householders retain 25% of the savings
arising from any measures installed during the repayment period,
with the remaining 75% diverted to the SPV. Thereafter, house-
holds retain all of the savings. Reﬂecting the base settings in the
model that generated the input data, it is assumed that perfor-
mance gaps are 41.6% and that rebound effects are 15% – in other
words they assume that 56.6% of the technical energy savings
potential of any measure is lost. As more recent assessments have
found that performance gaps and rebound effects are much lower
than these levels (see Webber et al., 2015), this means that the
model may generate conservative predictions both of the ﬁnancial
viability of the revolving fund and the carbon savings that it might
generate. The default settings also assume that 5% of all house-
holds default on their ﬁnancial obligations, but that the SPV is still
responsible for repaying any ﬁnance provided to these households.
Finally, it is assumed that energy companies are paid 0.1% of the
savings to pay for the administrative costs associated with col-
lecting repayments and feeding them back to the SPV.
While these values are adopted in the baseline run of the
model, we also examine some of the sensitivities in the analysis to
help us to understand the most signiﬁcant factors shaping these
outcomes. Speciﬁcally, we examine the effects of altering 5 key
variables both individually, whilst holding all other factors con-
stant, and in combination;
1. Increasing (and reducing) energy prices from the central to the
high and low energy price forecasts provided by DECC (2012b);
2. Increasing (and reducing) the difference or spread between the
SPV's borrowing and threshold IRR to 2% (and 0%);
3. Increasing (and reducing) performance gaps from 41.6% to 50%
(and 30%);
4. Increasing (and reducing) the level of savings retained by
householders whilst loans to the SPV are being repaid from 25%
to 30% (and 20%) of estimated savings; and
5. Increasing (and reducing) the level of household defaults from
5% to 7% (and 3%).
Finally, to explore the potential for the fund to run in different
ways, using the default settings we examine the impacts of three
key variants in the design and operation of the fund on investment
needs, ﬁnancial viability and on the carbon savings it could
achieve.
The ﬁrst variant considers the implications of only funding
measures with a particular payback period. Rather than funding all
of the 23 measures mentioned above, we limit the measures that
can be funded to those with 15, 10 and 5 year payback periods.
Whilst a fund seeking maximum carbon savings might fund all
measures, a fund that seeks to minimise investment needs or
Fig. 3. Proﬁle of annual and accumulated carbon savings with default settings.
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back periods.
The second variant considers the impacts of changing the af-
fordability of different inducements to householders. As partici-
pation in domestic retroﬁt schemes may be restricted by short-
termism and risk aversity, we consider the implications of a vou-
cher scheme that gives householders 10% of the total costs of the
measures installed as ‘cash-back’ when they agree to participate.
This is in addition to the 25% of the value of the energy savings
that they are assumed to retain during the repayment period and
the 100% of savings that they retain thereafter. To ﬁnd ways of
paying for such inducements, we also consider the implications of
asking householders to pay back 10% of the energy savings esti-
mated after the repayment period but for a maximum of ten years
from the date of the initial investment.
The third variant considers the implications of assuming that
households only pay back the capital that they have received, with
no additional ﬁnancing component. In this case, the government
provides a subsidy to cover the ﬁnancing costs of the SPV. In each
period, the government thus pays interest on the outstanding
capital component of each measure to the SPV at the threshold IRR
rate. The case for such a subsidy comes from the public interest
beneﬁts that such investments would realise – for example in
helping to reduce fuel poverty, improve public heath and reduce
carbon emissions.3. Results
3.1. Main ﬁndings
Under the default settings set out above, the results show that
the total funding required to exploit the full realistic potential of
all 23 measures shown in Table 1 across the UK would be d33.7
billion. Obviously this is a very substantial level of investment, but
critically the results suggest that while d24.8 billion of this total
would need to come from new capital, d8.9 billion could come
from recycled investment based on savings that were recovered
and reinvested. The results show that recycled investment could
therefore make up 26.4% of the total investment needs over the
lifetime of the fund.
The capital ﬂows associated with this calibration of the model
are presented in Fig. 2. This shows that new investment of d1.5
billion of new capital would be required every year for the ﬁrst 12
years, but that the savings that these investments generate – that
for a period of nearly 30 years from year 5 would reach d3 billion
per year-would allow the proportion of the total savings captured
and reinvested by the SPV to grow to a peak of nearly d1.2 billion
in year 5. Critically, all available opportunities for investment in
the 23 energy efﬁciency and low carbon measures in the domestic
sector would be fully exploited within 18 years. Annual savings
increase after 15 years once expensive measures such as solid wall
insulation have been fully exploited. After this point, investment isFig. 2. Proﬁle of investments and savings with default settings.diverted to more cost-effective options with more rapid economic
paybacks. Once these investment opportunities had been fully
exploited, the SPV would not need either any new capital or to
retain and reinvest any of the on-going savings of its earlier in-
vestments. This would then allow it to signiﬁcantly accelerate its
repayments to its original investors and to become debt free after
38 years.
The levels of carbon savings arising from these investments are
depicted in Fig. 3. The graph shows that these investments would
reduce domestic carbon emissions in the UK by up to
9.3 megatonnes (MT) per year, which equates to c6.7% of their
2012 level. In 2012, the average level of emissions per home was
5 t (DECC, 2013a), and so the peak annual savings generated from
these investments would be equivalent to the 2012 level of
emissions from 1.86 million homes. This level of reduction would
be approached after 12 years when most investments have been
made – however it would decline over time as the carbon intensity
of electricity falls and as some of the measures reach the end of
their operating life; a feature that is particularly evident after 40
years. The results also show that over the lifetime of the invest-
ments, total carbon savings of 353 MT would be generated.
3.2. Sensitivity analysis
The results of the sensitivity analysis described above are set
out in Table 3. As can be seen, increasing energy prices, widening
the spread between borrowing and the SPV threshold IRR, and
lowering performance gaps all result in shorter payback times
from the SPV to the investors. These are now 32, 34 and 30 years
respectively. However, increasing the threshold IRR may have a
signiﬁcant effect on householder participation. There may there-
fore be a case for public support for the government to make ﬁ-
nancial support that enhances the viability of the revolving fund
without reducing levels of participation. We consider this further
below. Reducing performance gaps reduces new lending require-
ments by d3 bn, and increases recycled investment levels by the
same amount. In contrast, lowering energy prices, decreasing the
spread between borrowing rate and the threshold IRR, or in-
creasing performance gaps all have the effect of leaving the SPV
unable to fully repay investors.
Each of the other variations has a smaller impact on all outputs,
but varying them all together towards a best business case sce-
nario reduces new lending requirements by d6.6 billion, increases
recycled investment by the same level, increases peak carbon
savings by 2.8 MT per year and reduces the time taken for the SPV
to repay all loans to investors by 15 years. Comparative outputs for
the worst-case scenario are an increase of d4.6 billion in new ca-
pital requirements, a decrease in recycled investment of the same
level, a decrease in peak carbon savings of 2 MT per year and a
failure of the SPV to fully repay its debts to investors. This high-
lights the need for the adoption of risk mitigation measures, per-
haps in the form of government underwriting or the introduction
of supporting policies.
Table 3
Sensitivities and impacts of changing key variables.
Total investment
(dbn)
New lending
(dbn)
Recycled investment
(dbn)
Peak carbon sav-
ings (MT)
Lifetime carbon
savings (MT)
Time for SPV to become
debt free (yrs)
Default settings 33.7 24.8 8.9 9.3 353 38
High (low) energy prices 33.7 22.5 (27) 11.2 (6.7) 9.4 (9.2) 354 (353) 32 (–)
Increasing (reducing) spread to 2%
(0%)
33.7 24.5 (25.1) 9.2 (8.6) 9.3 (9.3) 353 (353) 34 (–)
Reducing (increasing) performance
gaps to 30% (50%)
33.7 21.8 (27.2) 11.9 (6.5) 11.9 (7.4) 448 (284) 30 (–)
Reducing (increasing) incentives to
20% (30%)
33.7 24.2 (25.7) 9.5 (8) 9.3 (9.3) 354 (353) 35 (42)
Reducing (increasing) defaults to 3%
(7%)
33.7 24.4 (25.5) 9.3 (8.2) 9.3 (9.3) 353 (353) 36 (41)
Overall best (worst) case scenario 33.7 18.2 (29.4) 15.5 (4.3) 12.1 (7.3) 449 (283) 23 (–)
Fig. 4. Proﬁle of investments and savings with government paying interest.
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After reverting to the default settings, we also examine the
impacts of the other changes outlined above. The impacts of these
changes are presented in Table 4. Total investment costs could be
reduced if the range of measures that could be funded was re-
stricted to those with paybacks of 15, 10 or 5 years. If the fund only
invested in measures with a 5 year payback period or less, total
investment costs could be cut from d33.7 bn to d8.8 bn, but the
lifetime carbon savings generated would be more than halved
from 354 to 175 MT. If a voucher scheme was adopted to en-
courage participation, total investment costs would increase by
d3.4 billion, and new lending needs would increase by d3.8 bn,
however this increase could be partly offset by asking house-
holders to pay back 10% of the energy savings realised after the
repayment period but for a maximum of ten years from the date of
the initial loan as this would save d2 billion in new investment
needs.
If the government were to fully subsidise the ﬁnancing re-
quirements of the SPV, this would signiﬁcantly decrease new
lending requirements (by d4.3 bn) whilst increasing recycled in-
vestment by an equal amount. The time for the householders to
repay the SPV would decrease to 24 years, at a cost to the gov-
ernment of d6.3 bn, as can be seen in Fig. 4. However, this would
have unintended consequences for the long-term viability of the
fund. This is because the subsidies from government to the SPV
would be conditional on the repayments from householders to the
SPV not including a ﬁnancing component. This would shorten
payback times and reduce income to the SPV, and this would alter
the cash ﬂow of the SPV to such an extent that it could not cover
its debts. At its lowest level after 24 years, the SPV's outstanding
debt would be d7 bn. If this debt was also to be paid by the gov-
ernment, then the total cost of the subsidy from government
would approach d14 bn. This is obviously a very considerable
amount, both in aggregate and as a proportion of the d33.7 bn
total investment needed to fund the retroﬁt scheme in its entirety.Table 4
Variations in programme design.
Total investment
(dbn)
New lending
(dbn)
Recycled
(dbn)
Default settings 33.7 24.9 8.8
Payback o15yrs 32.7 22.9 9.8
Payback o10yrs 15 7.9 7.1
Payback o5yrs 8.8 3.9 4.9
Voucher scheme 37.1 28.7 8.4
Voucher scheme plus 10yr 10%
payback
37.1 26.7 10.4
Government subsidised interest
(cost to Govt. is d6.2bn)
33.7 20.6 13.14. Discussion
The results presented above have important implications that
relate to the speciﬁc case of revolving funds, to wider discussions
about climate change ﬁnance and investment, and to much
broader debates on the changing roles and limited capacities of
the state, particularly in an age of austerity.
Speciﬁcally, the analysis has highlighted the need, or alter-
natively the opportunity, for very signiﬁcant levels of investment
to be undertaken that improve the energy efﬁciency and reduce
the carbon emissions of the UK housing stock. The results show
that the total level of funding needed to deploy all 23 measures
included in the analysis across the entire UK housing stock is d33.7
billion. Obviously this is a vast amount of money, but it is worth
pointing out that it represents 1.4% of the UK's 2012 level of GDP
and that the investment could be spread over many years.
Perhaps more importantly, the analysis has shown that with a
revolving fund such an extensive domestic sector retroﬁt scheme
could be made essentially cost-neutral, albeit with signiﬁcant up-
front investments that would only pay for themselves over an
extended period of time as energy savings come through. It has
also shown that the up-front investment costs of such a scheme
could be signiﬁcantly reduced (in this case by d8.9 billion) throughinvestment Peak carbon sav-
ings (MT)
Lifetime carbon
savings (MT)
Time for SPV to become
debt free (yrs)
9.2 354 38
9.2 345 40
5.7 186 33
5.2 175 20
9 352 45
9.1 353 41
9.4 354 24
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extent of the reduction in carbon emissions that could be gener-
ated through such investments. Although in this case a 6.7% drop
in domestic emissions is a relatively small reduction, the carbon
savings are equivalent to the emissions of 1.86 million houses.
Previous research has found that the impacts of implementing the
key energy efﬁciency and small scale renewable measures in-
cluded in this study have been higher than forecast (see Webber
et al., 2015).
It is also important to point out that the results are based on
ﬁgures that assume the ﬁnancing and deployment of a sub-set of
the wider range of energy efﬁciency and low carbon measures
available for the domestic sector and that a large proportion of the
savings that are technically achievable from these measures are
lost through signiﬁcant performance gaps and rebound effects.
Indeed, we see elsewhere in the analysis that addressing perfor-
mance gaps can have a very signiﬁcant effect on the ﬁnancial
viability of the scheme by reducing new investment needs and
replacing them with recycled investments. If initiatives to reduce
performance gaps were combined with, for example, subsidised
lending from the SPV, then the results suggest that further sub-
stantial reductions in new investment costs could be achieved but
at a very substantial cost to the government.
The results have also highlighted the ways in which the design
of a revolving fund could be varied to make it more ﬁnancially
viable and less risky, and to further incentivise participation in
such a scheme. We have shown that focusing a fund so that it only
invests in measures with short payback periods might make the
scheme much more ﬁnancially attractive, but that this would be
achieved at the expense of signiﬁcant cuts in the carbon savings
that can be realised. More positively, the results show that there
could be innovative ways of incentivising householder participa-
tion that again could be cost-neutral over time. Other forms of
policy support for a revolving fund could also be envisaged; gov-
ernments could enable the emergence and effective operation of
revolving funds by underwriting their borrowing to reduce default
risk and creating stable policy climates to further reduce levels of
uncertainty. They could also establish supporting incentive struc-
tures and provide guarantees, assurance and supporting regula-
tions that encourage participation and ensure that public interest
objectives are met.
All of these ﬁndings are also relevant to broader policy debates
on climate ﬁnance and investment in low carbon development.
The results suggest that the investment needs and the associated
investment gaps discussed at the beginning of this paper might be
signiﬁcantly reduced if revolving funds were widely deployed.
However, given the lack of research on climate ﬁnance in general
and revolving funds in particular, more work needs to be done to
consider the contexts in which and the extent to which revolving
funds can make a useful contribution. An important issue relates
to whether revolving funds have the ability to fund ‘deep retroﬁt’
initiatives that deliver much more signiﬁcant cuts in energy use
and carbon emissions than those demonstrated here. There are
also questions about whether, how and to what extent revolving
funds could be applied to new buildings as well as the retroﬁt of
existing buildings, to commercial and industrial as well as do-
mestic buildings and to other sectors such as energy or transport.
And more broadly there are important issues about the extent to
which revolving funds could be adopted, the ways in which they
should be designed and governed and the extent to which they
can perform in different social, political and economic conditions.
More generally, the broad ﬁnding that revolving funds could
enable major public interest programmes to be undertaken in
ways that both signiﬁcantly reduce the need for new investment
and that even render substantial programmes cost-neutral over
time could be of great importance. This ﬁnding suggests thatinnovative ﬁnancing arrangements such as revolving funds could
enable states with limited capacities and resources to act in con-
texts and on issues where action might otherwise be impossible.
Pragmatically, therefore, it seems that revolving funds could have
massive potential, particularly in an era of austerity.
The model presented here allows us to start to consider the
potential contribution of different sources and types of ﬁnance. For
example, if the revolving fund is ﬁnanced by the private sector,
this is likely to require the interest rate to be higher than if the
capital was provided by the public sector and it may also require
the capital to be repaid over a shorter period (Sullivan et al., 2013).
In relation to this latter point, we note that there is signiﬁcant
institutional investor interest in long-term (20þ years) invest-
ment structures and opportunities (see, for example, OECD, 2013),
and so there may be good alignment between these investors'
timeframes and the investment and repayment periods of such a
fund. Similarly, when we look at the role of government funding,
the model allows us to explore how different funding interven-
tions may be deployed. For example, government funding could be
used to provide some level of insurance against defaults, to reduce
the cost of capital, to reduce the level of capital required (through
debt or equity ﬁnancing), to provide direct incentives to house-
holds, or to cover some of the setup and transaction costs for the
SPV or the installers. In each case, the effect of these on the re-
volving fund's cash ﬂows, revenues, proﬁts and repayments can be
explicitly modelled and assessed. It also enables the ﬁnancial im-
pacts on the other actors involved, which may include central and
local government, capital providers, energy providers and service
companies, businesses and households, to be assessed. Finally, the
model enables the effect of transaction costs such as SPV fees and
set-up costs on investment returns and capital deployment to be
evaluated.
Returning to our earlier comment about the ﬁnancing of energy
efﬁciency in an era of austerity, the analysis presented here sug-
gests that central government can help stimulate these invest-
ments in a whole host of ways and at much lower cost than central
government looking to actually fund such investments directly. It
suggests that governments can encourage and provide practical
support to local authorities, community groups or other bodies
looking to invest in energy efﬁciency within their areas, and that
government can help address some of the key investment risks
associated with these investments (see Sullivan, 2011, Sullivan et
al., 2013) and thereby encourage the private sector to invest in
energy efﬁciency. Within this, it is important to recognise that
many investment risks relate to, or are informed by, investors'
views on the dependability of public policy measures such as
carbon taxes and their views on governments' long-term com-
mitment to action on climate change and energy efﬁciency. The
fact that central and/or local government provides some level of
ﬁnancial support for the revolving fund is, in itself, likely to be
seen as mitigating some of the ﬁnancial risks and, in turn, may see
private investors being happy to receive lower rates of return on
their investments.
While the broad case for using revolving funds to support the
ﬁnancing of energy efﬁciency is clear, they also raise profound
questions around governance, accountability and legitimacy. Some
of these issues are critically important in public policy debates:
measures to mitigate ﬁnancial risks may be seen as effectively
being a form of subsidy to the private sector; a limited focus on
economically attractive options may mean that governments do
not achieve their wider climate change commitments; the in-
volvement of central government or of the private sector may limit
the autonomy of local government or community groups to de-
velop funds that deliver on wider local priorities and concerns.
More generally, there is also what many would see as a danger
that revolving funds – and the greater involvement of non-state
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goods beneﬁts such as reducing greenhouse gas emissions or
improving energy efﬁciency and strengthening energy security
and resilience-could be used by some to argue for the further
curtailment of the powers of the state. This is particularly relevant
in contexts where, in a climate of austerity or neoliberalism, many
governments are moving away from being the provider of public
goods and instead acting as facilitators or enablers for other pri-
vate or civic actors to deliver these public goods (Gouldson and
Sullivan, 2014). Whether or not this is a politically desirable out-
come is to some extent open to debate, but it is important to note
that some important variables considered in the analysis above are
likely to vary depending on how a scheme is both funded and
governed. A privately funded, proﬁt-driven scheme that is poorly
supported or loosely regulated is likely to have a narrower focus
and to generate lower levels of saving than a publicly or civically
funded, not-for-proﬁt scheme that is more actively supported or
more closely regulated to ensure that it generates wider social and
environmental beneﬁts. One of the contributions of this article –
and a focus of our on-going research-is that the revolving funds
model presented enables the ﬁnancial costs and beneﬁts and the
public goods outcomes (in terms of energy savings or greenhouse
gas emission reductions) to be explicitly identiﬁed and assessed,
thereby enabling a more informed debate on the costs, beneﬁts
and implications of this type of innovative ﬁnancing mechanism.5. Conclusions and policy implications
Although there is a strong economic case for climate action at
the global scale, in many settings the ability of both public and
private actors to invest in low carbon development has been cur-
tailed in recent years. Globally, levels of investment fall a long way
short of those required if dangerous climate change is to be
avoided. There is therefore a pressing need to explore the potential
of innovative ﬁnancing arrangements that might stimulate ﬂows
of capital into, and ideally also to reduce the costs and increase the
effectiveness of, climate action.
This paper has explored the contribution that revolving funds
might make in this respect, with a particular focus on their ability
to ﬁnance improvements in the energy performance of the
buildings sector. To explore the practical contribution that revol-
ving funds could make to solving this problem, the paper proposed
a generic model of a revolving fund and applied it based on the
speciﬁc case of the domestic sector in the UK. The ﬁnding that a
revolving fund could reduce the cost of an extensive retroﬁt pro-
gramme by 26%, or d9 billion, is signiﬁcant in itself as it increases
the chance that governments with scarce resources will intervene
to promote retroﬁt. Obviously we should be very cautious when
extrapolating from one case, but if a similar scale of reduction
could be made to the US$31 trillion that the IEA forecasts will be
required to promote energy efﬁciency in buildings over the next
40 years, then the savings would equate to US$8 trillion. This
ﬁgure gives a broad indication of the scale of the contribution that
revolving funds could make if they were widely adopted to ﬁnance
the retroﬁt of the buildings sector.
But the ﬁnding that the entire retroﬁt programme could be
make cost-neutral over an extended period perhaps has more
profound policy implications as it suggests that retroﬁt could be
enabled by government but ﬁnanced and delivered by private or
civic actors. This ﬁnding is very much in line with broader debates
on governance that argue that in many settings we are witnessing
a move away from the position where the state is relied upon to
provide public services and toward a position where states facil-
itate or enable private or civic actors to provide those services. This
implies a radical shift in the role of government and in the natureof the relationship between the public, private and civic sectors.
The enabling role of government could be pivotal if revolving
funds and other innovative ﬁnancing mechanisms are to fulﬁl their
apparent potential. The experience to date with revolving funds is
limited, and there is therefore a need to strengthen the evidence
base on how they function, on their costs and beneﬁts, and on the
ﬁnancial risk management and mitigation measures that may be
adopted to improve their performance and on how these affect the
ﬁnancial and energy saving outcomes that are seen. There is also a
need to look much more explicitly at the governance of these
funds and the associated delivery vehicles, at both the macro level
(i.e. do they accelerate the withdrawal of the state from certain
types of public good provision) and at the local level (i.e. how do
they affect local needs and interests, how do they affect local
governance). These factors deserve urgent attention given the
apparent potential of revolving funds to close the climate ﬁnance
gap – and government support for pilot and demonstration
schemes is probably required given the reluctance of private and
civic actors to invest in novel and perhaps more risky schemes. If
they can be properly proven, then the analysis presented in this
paper suggests that revolving funds clearly have the potential to
enable intensiﬁed and accelerated action on climate change, even
in an era of austerity.Acknowledgements
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